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A B S T R A C T
Rapid urbanisation in Somalia, as in many other war-torn countries, is driven by in-migration of displaced
people who are often amassed in camps. Although such camps become institutionalised sites of exclusion where
‘bare life’ is generated and disposed, they are also characterised by socially messy and continuously evolving
relations of space, power, violence and displacement. The article draws on fieldwork with displaced people in
Somali cities to analyse claims to property and (often violent) competition to uphold them in contestation for
sovereignty. Comparing two cities, Mogadishu and Bosaaso, we show how a broad range of international and
local actors, including displaced people themselves, negotiate (urban) property and establish relations that guide
and foster political authority, while rendering the lives and livelihoods of displaced people precarious and in-
secure. In property, politics and the economy intersect, and property relations are therefore subject to struggles
for both power and profit. We underscore how sovereign power produces spaces of indistinction, but emphasise
that property as an analytical category contributes to understandings of sovereignty. Furthermore, propertying
as social practice draws attention to the way sovereignty emerges and is connected to the market. This enables
the differentiations of forms of sovereignty and draws attention to how it is negotiated, openly challenged or
silently undermined.
Similar to other war-torn countries, rapid growth of cities is evident
in Somalia. Although no reliable statistics on cities are available, it is
apparent that urbanisation is to a large extent driven by in-migration of
people displaced from other parts of the region. Many cities are sur-
rounded by camps in which the displaced are amassed. Evidence from
Somalia's long history of conflict (Cassanelli, 2015; Hoehne, 2016) as
well as examples from other countries (Buescher, 2018) suggest that the
majority of displaced people will likely stay in the city. This article
examines how enforced migration contributes to urbanisation and the
making of cities. The focus is on urban camps, as they have evolved into
a prevailing mode of conflict-induced urbanisation.
This exploration of camp urbanisation builds theoretically on
Agamben’s (1998) conceptualisation of the camp as spatial enclosure
characterised by a permanent ‘state of exception’ and used to dispose of
‘bare life’ - that is, life reduced to its mere biological functions. The
camp, according to Agamben, exists outside normal legal frameworks,
and this exceptionality allows for the continued reproduction of bare
life that Agamben identifies as a core of biopolitics and insignia of
modernity. Agamben developed a distinct ‘spatial theory of power,
sovereignty and displacement’ (Ek, 2006, p. 364), which we outline in
more detail below. Somalia provides an exemplary case for the em-
pirical exploration of this theory. Against the backdrop of war, state-
collapse and internationalised rule, Somalia can easily be interpreted as
the ‘coming to light of the state of exception as permanent structure’
and as an example of how entire populations are transformed into bare
life (Agamben, 1998, p. 28; 101). Three decades of violent conflicts
across different parts of the country have wreaked havoc on rural and
urban environments and people's lives. The state stopped functioning,
formal law was suspended,1 hundreds of thousands lost their lives, and
many more have been displaced and lost their means of survival. In the
global (and sometimes local) imaginary, the entire country has acquired
a particular status as a deviant space or ‘Badland’. This perception is
shaped by multiple forms of violence that threaten the national, re-
gional and international order, among them clan-based violence, Isla-
mist militancy, or piracy. Different forms of violence have caused mass-
migrations, and have precipitated a large number of international in-
terventions, many of which are ongoing (Al-Bulushi, 2014).
In spite of this convergence with Agamben's theory, we find his
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concepts of sovereignty and displacement too static for the processual
character of space and power, displacement and sovereignty, not least
in how they have evolved in the midst of the prolonged ‘state of ex-
ception’ that has characterised Somalia in the last decades. While we
retain Agamben's politically powerful frame of camps as spaces of ex-
ception, we empirically ‘re-fill’ it by investigating living conditions in
camps, focusing in particular on the ways these camps are managed and
governed. We use the example of two cities, Mogadishu in the war-torn
south and Bosaaso in the more stable north of Somalia to explore lives
in the midst of normalized exception. This empirical analysis builds on
82 interviews, mostly with people who were forced to flee from vio-
lence and drought. At the time of the interviews in 2017 and 2018,
interviewees lived in eight camps across Mogadishu and five camps in
Bosaaso. Bosaaso interviewees had settled in the city between 10 and
19 years, while interviewees in Mogadishu had lived there between 3
months and 8 years.2
Our study shows that displacement produces bare life in Agamben's
sense. However, it also shows that camps circumscribe quite different
places, and that they are sites where agency exists. We suggest using
property as an additional analytical category to capture the socially
messy and processual relations of space, power, and violence. Property
relations are based on inclusion and exclusion, and link sovereignty - as
an attempt to perpetuate authority over a given territory and its people
- to practices of displacement. Unlike Agamben, we do not con-
ceptualize sovereignty as a juridical-institutional status (linked to a
state), but as social practice in which actors (among them state actors)
have to establish and maintain their authority in competition with other
actors (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005, p. 3). In support of the processual
approach and empirical analysis, we differentiate empirical or de-facto
sovereignty from legal sovereignty: the former identified in the ‘right
over life’ and thus ‘the ability to kill, punish and discipline with im-
punity wherever it is found and practiced’; the latter a formalized ‘le-
gitimate right to govern’. Our focus on empirical sovereignty allows us
to study sovereignty as a ‘tentative and always emergent form of au-
thority grounded in violence’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2006, pp. 296–7,
also Lund, 2016).
The Somali city examples show that this competition for sovereignty
may be executed through claims to property: land, real-estate, territory
or, in some cases, people. The violence of these claims and the ac-
companying production of disposable lives, are striking in the context
of Somalia. Nonetheless, the country is neither unique nor exceptional.
Processes that are currently unfolding in Somalia are indicative of the
(often violent) ways in which political authority is established, and for
the global-local entanglements that shape forms of government in
conflict-prone regions. In Somalia, cities are assembled through prac-
tices in which a broad range of international and local actors, including
displaced people, are engaging in the definition, demarcation and
contestation of (urban) property and in developing regimes to regulate
and control it - albeit from quite different positions of power.
In order to develop this argument, we first outline Agamben's spatial
theory of sovereignty, exception and bare life, but complement it with
property. Property, we argue, is well suited to capturing the messy
social practices and nuances of sovereignty (in the making) and how
these are linked to displacement. After a section that introduces the
Somali conflicts and patterns of displacement and urbanisation, the
third section comparatively analyses the ways in which displaced
people have experienced and act upon existing modes of urban gov-
ernment. We identify propertying3 as important social practice that
structures camp life and determines the ways camps are assembled
within the wider city. We also show that actors use property to establish
their authority over places and thereby further contribute to violence
and displacement.
1. Expanding and propertising ‘spaces of exception’
Agamben’s (1998, p. 12) self-declared correction/completion of
Foucault's works on biopolitics is often applied in research on dis-
placement and camps (Bauman, 2004; Giroux, 2006; Martin, 2015;
Minca, 2015; Turner, 2005). Biopolitics, according to Agamben, is the
process by which exception becomes the rule and by which ‘bare life’,
that is ‘life that is irremediably exposed to death’ (1998, p. 2), is in-
distinctly aligned to politics and moves from the margins to the centre
of the political order. Agamben's early identification of the camp as
prototypical ‘space of exception’ and as ‘hidden paradigm of the poli-
tical space of modernity’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 73) is confirmed in the
existence of Guantanamo Bay, or by international regimes governing
mobility. Policies to regulate in-migration to Europe are, for example,
characterised by their indifferent acceptance of the death of thousands
of migrants in the Mediterranean, and by the establishment of mili-
tarized camps where people - whose crime seems simply to be their
search for better lives - are incarcerated. Sovereign power no longer
establishes itself merely as border between law and exception, but de-
velops into a ‘zone of irreducible indistinction’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 9)
allowing or even promoting the expansion of camps as sites for the
disposal of bare life.
The global zone of indistinction is filled with bodies of migrants.
Their government-through-containment attests to the rise of new forms
of internationalised rule, a ‘global governmentality’ that transcends the
state-centred focus on national populations and instead targets the
human population at a global scale (Larner and Walters, 2004; Lui,
2004; Agier, 2010). The global government of migration is co-
operatively executed by international humanitarians and national so-
vereigns. In spite of their benevolent intention, humanitarians display a
‘secret solidarity’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 133) with sovereigns by em-
phasizing humanitarian needs of the displaced and by making the
‘management of the basic functions of life’ their main business
(Hoffman, 2008, p. 405). Humanitarians thereby separate political life
from life reduced to its biological functions. While they are treating the
displaced as incarnations of bare life, they are reducing them to their
need for humanitarian support in order to be kept alive. In this way,
humanitarian regimes are inadvertently contributing to the expansion
of bare life (Agamben, 1998, p. 78; Turner, 2005, p. 314).
Although Agamben's version of biopolitics seems to have become a
sad reality, his work also been critiqued. His ‘eclectic collection of
empirical evidence’ (Mills, 2004, p. 47) and undifferentiated treatment
of camps neglects variety and renders camps and their inhabitants in-
distinguishable (Turner, 2005, p. 313). His nomological understanding
of biopolitics contrasts with Foucault's genealogical and empirical ex-
ploration of how modern institutions emerge as part of knowledge
practices that establish truth claims and constitute normality through
procedures of exclusion. That is, by separating the rational from the
mad, the normal from the abnormal, the truth from the false (Foucault,
1996, pp. 10-11) and, we would add, the productive from the dis-
posable. Agamben also ignores camps' embeddedness in wider eco-
nomic and political processes (Lemke, 2005, pp 4-5), thus de-histor-
icizing and depoliticizing them. The Somali examples show that camp
life is shaped by (political) negotiations, contentions and struggles, and
confirm the need to delve deeper into the ways camps are embedded in
the political economy of the city and beyond. Camps in Somalia are
subjected to struggles for both profit and authority, and this has drawn
our attention to the relevance of property in these struggles.
Devenney (2011) has recently elaborated the political character of
property, inherent in any form of deliberation and decision-making.
Accordingly, property establishes enclosures by activating boundaries
that demarcate inclusion and exclusion, and differentiate those who
2 The interviews were conducted by teams of researchers led by Abdirahman
Edle Ali. Among the researchers were Ahmed Abdulahi Dualeh (Hargeisa),
Mohamed Abdiqadir Botan (Bosaaso), Ahmed Takow Hassan (Mogadishu) and
Ismail Abdullahi Moalim (Baidoa). Our thanks for their exceptional work.
3 Term borrowed from Elliott, 2016: Footnote 22.
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access or appropriate property from those who don't or can't. This
characterisation of property can be traced back to Max Weber (1980:
pp. 23-24, 203ff.), who conceptualised property as ‘organised social
closure’ constituted through rights and obligations that provide some
people with access to (tangible or intangible) objects while excluding
others. Property is thus enacted by mobilising and assembling specific
relations between people and objects, relations that are then, as prop-
erty, normalized and often also naturalised. Blomley additionally em-
phasizes how property practices violently enact and shape space (2003,
p. 122). Focusing on private land, he demonstrates how violence has
been used to claim, enforce and defend property while displacing others
(Blomley, 2003, p. 121, 128). We label as propertying, both the prac-
tices of assembling material and immaterial relations that enact space,
and their simultaneous generation of (layered) rights and obligations
that guide those relations themselves.
According to Devenney (2011, p. 152), property is mostly regulated
by a sovereign who builds on legal and violent means to define and
delineate (rightful) owners from criminals. Sovereignty is therefore
executed, in part, through the definition, enforcement and enactment of
property. However, sovereignty itself is not external to, but deeply in-
tertwined within, property as it lays claim to ownership of land, which
is then transformed into and produced as territory (Bahia, 1971; Lund,
2016). Territory is the form in which space is produced by a ruling
authority or a state in a specific historical period (Elden, 2013, p. 6;
Agnew, 1994). This production of territory is rooted in and simulta-
neously perpetuates particular relations of property in which the ruling
authority claims ownership and control over land and people in ways
that enhance knowledge of that territory. Using measurements, surveys,
statistics and maps, territorial property establishes boundaries that
constitute an ‘inside’ order of politics based on shared norms, and se-
parates this from an ‘outside’, delineated as a potential threat to the
former. These technologies also produce land in particular ways and
eventually naturalise this process. Although land merely circumscribes
a politicized, potentially enforced, and always policed ‘relation between
owners and others (including non-owners)’, it is increasingly perceived
as essential relation between an ‘owner and inert space’ (Blomley, 2003,
pp. 131–32). Property thereby evolves into an important disciplinary
mechanism that shapes people's behaviours and reifies relations of
power. Foucault (1994, p. 99) additionally outlined that the increase
and moral upgrading of property required adjustments of norms of
legality and illegality, continuous surveillance, and new technologies of
inquiry able to capture those who transgress property regulations. Such
governmental practices and technologies of propertying produce effects
like the ‘isomorphism of space, place and culture’ (Gupta and
Fergusson, 1992, p. 7). This fosters a sense of belonging whereby a
sovereign is aligned with a territory, and both are naturalised as na-
tional (Painter, 2010).
However, as Agnew (1994) reminds us - and as Somalia exemplifies
- territory is only one kind of spatiality, and political power can inscribe
itself in spaces in many different ways. It is therefore helpful to draw
again on Weber (1980, pp. 203ff.) who discussed the relationship be-
tween property and political authority in more detail. He outlined how
types of authority assemble relations of property in various ways,
ranging from patriarchal, patrimonial, hierarchical and personal, to
more impersonal, bureaucratic, commercialized-private, collective or
sacralised relations characterising different forms of ownership. Ac-
cording to Weber (1980, pp. 209ff.), the organisation of enclosure of a
valued object, also implies that owners start to develop an order that
ensures the persistence of rights and obligations vis-à-vis things and
each other. Propertying is thus executed simultaneously with others
and towards others, as it implies and generates rules that govern and
order social life. Weber also outlined that property depends on the
availability of mechanisms to enforce this order. The need to reiterate
and if necessary defend, or enforce, principles and relations of property
rationalises the formation of political authority. Sovereignty, in our
understanding, emanates from, and goes beyond, political authority as
it entails the recognition of the right to define property. As the highest
form of political authority in a territory that sovereignty itself con-
stitutes, sovereignty is itself an expression of established relations of
property, but is simultaneously constituted as power to define and de-
marcate these relations. Sovereignty makes property relations legal and
(violently) protects both the relations and borders that property con-
stitutes and reproduces. The decision of who is entitled to hold property
(and in which form) is, as Lund (2016) reminds us and the empirical
analysis below shows, deeply interwoven with questions of belonging,
and thus with questions of citizenship.
The following sections explore practices, relations, technologies and
(emergent) regimes of property in Somali cities through the experiences
of displaced people. This approach reveals how actors enforce claims
towards sovereignty, how these claims are intrinsically linked to dis-
placement and contribute to the creation of disposable life. It also
shows that bare life exists with many nuances and variations, and that it
is, at least in these Somali cases, not without agency.
2. Conflict-driven urbanisation: Mogadishu and Bosaaso
Cities in contemporary Somalia have been profoundly shaped by
political and economic instability, violent conflict and war. Mogadishu
and Bosaaso are located under different political authorities tenuously
embedded in attempts to rebuild a central state and to re-establish state
sovereignty. Mogadishu is the capital of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, internationally recognised as sovereign since 2012. The city
hosts a parliament and a government which exercises limited empirical
sovereignty beyond the city's limits. This government's authority de-
pends to a large extent on the military support of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the political support of the UN and
other donors4 and to ‘security partners’ linked to the Global War against
Terror. The port city of Bosaaso is the economic hub of the Puntland
State of Somalia. Puntland was established 1998 as an autonomous
region. Although Puntland has been described as the most fully con-
solidated member of the newly founded Somali Republic (Mosley,
2015), formal relations between Puntland and the Federal government
remain unstable and ill-defined.
Many of the violent conflicts that shattered south-central Somalia
found their most pronounced expression in Mogadishu. The city was at
the centre of power-struggles immediately following the collapse of the
state in 1991, when violence was driven by competition between the
clan-based militias that had ousted President Siyaad Barre (in power
since 1969). This period was also characterised by indiscriminate per-
secution and mass-killing of people affiliated with Darood (sub)clans5
associated with the former government (Bakonyi, 2010; Kapteijns,
2013). With their leaders unable to agree on a power-sharing formula,
militias started to fight in changing alliances against each other. The
intertwinement of (claims to) sovereignty with (claims to) property,
and both justified through claims of belonging, was clearly visible when
clashes between the two main contenders for the Presidency led to the
division of Mogadishu, each part (more or less) controlled by one of the
self-proclaimed Presidents and their militias (Marchal, 2002, p. 2).
Since the presidential contenders hailed from the Hawiye ‘clan-family’,
these two areas were increasingly associated as ‘belonging to’ one or the
other sub-clans of the respective self-declared Presidents.
The claim to political authority was translated into a right to
4 Traditional Western donor states, and inter/supranational organisations
increasingly operate alongside Gulf states, Turkey and China.
5 Somali society is often seen to be divided into four to six ‘clan-families’:
Darood, Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq (sometimes considered as subgroup of Dir), Digil
and Mirifle (sometimes amalgamated as the Raxanweyn). The clan families are
further sub-divided in clans and sub-clans. Other ‘minority’ caste or racial
groups fall outside of these main lineages, but are still considered (and may
consider themselves) to be ‘Somalis’.
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property, as militias took over previously state-owned buildings, among
them schools and hospitals, but also state-owned export farms and land
in regions neighbouring Mogadishu. Some militias even claimed prop-
erty of bodies, forcing people from racially stigmatised groups to work
on their newly acquired farms (Bestemann and Cassanelli, 2003).
Claims to ownership rapidly expanded from public and government
sites to more mundane buildings, such as houses, shops or restaurants of
people considered loyal to the former dictator. While expanding their
power from Mogadishu to other regions, militias targeted members of
weaker or unarmed clan groups, committed numerous atrocities, ex-
propriated land and farm products, and even looted food stocks in the
regions in which they tried to establish control (Bakonyi, 2010). The
right to rule was translated into the right to take ownership, to trans-
gress and reshuffle existing property relations. This extortionist warfare
in combination with a drought precipitated a large-scale humanitarian
crisis and drew in the first military humanitarian intervention
(1992–95), led by the United States and the United Nations.
UN forces left Somalia in 1995. Mogadishu, like the rest of south-
central Somalia was divided into a patchwork of smaller enclaves, each
controlled by a militia from a Hawiye (sub-)clan and their leaders, so-
called warlords. The intensity of violence decreased under the authority
of the warlords (1995–2005), partly because the fragmentation of clan-
militias resulted in the loss of violent man power, and partly because of
a rising business class. Commercial activities were initially conducted
through profitable alliances with warlords, but over time many business
people mobilised their own militias to defend their newly acquired
properties, and their interests increasingly deviated from those of the
warlords (Marchal, 2002). Business people also supported the estab-
lishment of Islamic courts in the early 2000s, as they provided me-
chanisms to protect property and helped to regulate trade across the
territories controlled by clan militias (Barnes and Hassan, 2007;
Ahmad, 2015). Multiple actors, among them militias, warlords and
religious organisations, simultaneously claimed and exercised sover-
eignty in Mogadishu and beyond, at times in contestation, at other
times in cooperation with each other.
When a rising Union of Islamic Courts appeared to have prevailed in
the sovereignty contest, the Ethiopian military intervened on the side of
an internationally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an
institution that included many warlords. The defeat of the Courts Union
in 2006 instated the TFG as the ruling authority in Mogadishu.
Ethiopian forces were later joined by troops from the African Union
(AMISOM), and the TFG-AMISOM alliance was soon engaged in re-
newed fighting with a revived Islamist movement, spearheaded by Al-
Shabaab. By 2010, Al-Shabaab controlled most of south-central
Somalia, while the authority of the TFG and their international sup-
porters was limited to certain districts in Mogadishu.
From 2007, violence between Islamist militias and TFG/AMISOM
forces escalated dramatically, especially in Mogadishu. Both sides were
engaged in massive human rights violations and used indiscriminate vio-
lence (HRW, 2007) leading once more to large-scale displacements out of
Mogadishu. Combined with Al-Shabaab's aggressive stand against huma-
nitarian organisations, the war aggravated the effects of a drought, leading
to a famine roughly coinciding with the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from
Mogadishu in 2011. Both initiated large-scale migration into the city,
where humanitarian aid was available and security slowly improved. The
transition period of the government ended in 2012, and the Somali Federal
Government (SFG) established itself as rightful sovereign in Mogadishu. By
then approximately 300,000 displaced people were living in Mogadishu,
mostly in deplorable conditions (Hammond, 2013, p. 70). Three years
later, a UNHCR-led profiling survey identified 400,000 internally dis-
placed (UNHCR, 2016, p. 3), a number that would amount to nearly one
third of Mogadishu's estimated 1.5 Million inhabitants.6 Many newcomers
squat in ruins of collapsed buildings, construct huts or tents (Somali: buul)
in ‘empty’ city places, or join overcrowded camps at Mogadishu's outskirts
(see photo 1).
Camp settlements in Mogadishu became entangled in a rising
number of land disputes that are often articulated in clan terms (RVI
and HIPS, 2017). Although Mogadishu is populated by people from all
clans, most districts and neighbourhoods continue to be politically
dominated by (and associated with) particular Hawiye sub-clans that
used to control them during the ‘warlord’ period.
Compared to south-central Somalia, the north-east has remained
relatively peaceful. The port city of Bosaaso, largely spared from mass
violence, became a major destination for people displaced from other
regions. In-migration was also stimulated by economic growth and
employment opportunities, as well as by Bosaaso's proximity to Yemen,
providing an option for dangerous migration to the Arabian Peninsula
or further (Ali, 2016). The foundations for Bosaaso's economic growth
and its development into an international trade-hub were laid in the
1980s when the city started operating a duty-free port and when the
road that linked the city to the south was rehabilitated (Marchal, 2010,
p. 19). With state collapse and the intensification of violence in Mo-
gadishu many people from the former dictator's extended Darood
lineage group, among them also former government officials, moved to
the northeast where they sought sanctuary from clan-targeted mass
violence. Some of these in-migrants used their savings (including
money previously embezzled from state coffers) to transition into pri-
vate enterprise. The creation and relative stability of the Puntland ad-
ministration since 1998 attracted investment from the Somali diaspora
and facilitated the rise of a new business class (Marchal, 2010, p. 20).
Different phases of conflict in south-central Somalia also prompted
those from other regions to move north. For example, many people
from the Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle regions fled to Bosaaso after
2006 in an attempt to escape the war between the government/
AMISOM and Al-Shabaab. In 2001, UNDP (2001, p. 58) estimated Bo-
saaso's population at around 60,000, while nine years later UN Habitat
estimated already 150,000 people, among them 35,000 internally dis-
placed people (Decorte and Tempra, 2010, p. 16). The city's municipal
government even reported a total population of 500–700,000 in 2015
(IDMC, 2015, p. 5). While these statistics are likely inaccurate, avail-
able satellite imagery of the city since 2003 demonstrates the rapid
expansion and urban sprawl of the city.
Compared to Mogadishu, relative stability in Bosaaso has allowed for a
rather uninterrupted process of displacement-linked urban growth. This
has played out over a longer period, and allowed for urban planning. This
has included the development of an urban transformation plan entailing
the resettlement of displaced people. UN agencies, in collaboration with
the Puntland state, the local municipal government, and private land-
owners, have relocated a large number of displaced people from the city
centre to its outskirts (see photo 2). The resettlement was undertaken
alongside other infrastructural developments and has had a lasting impact
on the character of property relations and interactions between displaced
people from clan groups different to those claimed to be original in-
habitants of the city, even if those original ‘local’ inhabitants arrived as
recently as many other displaced people.
The following section compares settlement practices of the (see-
mingly) spontaneously formed camps in Mogadishu with the planned
re-settlement areas in Bosaaso, and explores mechanisms and norms
governing camp life. The analysis shows that even without formal land-
6 Prolonged insecurity has made Somalia particularly resistant to surveying
practices that accompany (biopolitical) forms of statebuilding (Bakonyi, 2018).
The few numbers in this article are rough estimates and provide merely an
indication of trends.
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use policies or legislation, property relations are enacted, and guide and
foster claims of authority.8
3. Property and precarity in Mogadishu
The following is an extract from an interview with Wiilo
(Mogadishu, 09/01/2018), a 38-year old woman who fled to
Mogadishu during the famine of 2011:
The rivers dried, there was no water and there was a bad drought –
through Jilaal, Gu and Deyr [seasons] the water did not come back.
At no time did water come back. We were without water. It was hard
when my children died. So, we came [to Mogadishu]. Two of my
brothers and I were living in a place owned by the government […]
that I now forgot the name of. After some time, we were told to
vacate the camp because the land was the government's. We then
moved toMaslah camp and lived there for one or two years. We then
moved and settled at Shabelle University [another camp] and that is
where we stayed for some time, and worked for ourselves. We woke
up early in the morning to go into Xamar [Mogadishu] to look for
work, like laundry, when it was available […].
So, the government kicked you off the land you were on?
Someone came in the camp and wrote something on a red painted
area. I didn't understand it, because I cannot read. I can just write
my name. Some of the elders came and read it for us and said that it
was a notice for us to vacate the camp. We had a month before we
would be kicked out. The man who warns you is not killing you
[proverb]. My father told us before the notice time ends, he will go
and look for a place for us to move. My brothers were living in
Maslah camp and we then moved there […] and lived there for
about year […]. Then [we came] here in my current camp where I
lived for three years. I came to Mogadishu five years ago.
How was the life in your previous camps?
Photo 1. Camp in Mogadishu (by Asha, a displaced person living in the camp7).
Photo 2. Re-settlement at Bosaaso's outskirts (by Nuurow, displaced person living in the settlement).
7 Beyond narrative interviews, the research also drew on photo-voice and
equipped displaced people with cameras to document their daily lives. This
article does not draw on the photo-voice analysis, but uses two of the photos to
illustrate camp spaces. For details of the research design and outcomes:
securityonthemove.co.uk.
8 We cannot show if and how these patterns were affected by al-Shabaab. The
Islamist militants continue to exert considerable influence in both cities, e.g.
through shadow taxation systems and Shariah courts, and therefore likely affect
property. However, interviewees did not talk in great detail about al-Shabaab.
This might be because of fear or because their everyday was not (much) af-
fected by them.
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I speak the truth clearly, and don't lie: we never even got a bar of
soap to wash in those camps. The first year after I came from
Dhoobey [rural area], I didn't know the place or anyone around and
didn't have any family nearby […] But luckily my sister-in-law and
her children knew the place better than me. They helped me look for
work - laundry and cleaning houses. That camp had many thieves.
They steal from you. There was no security and no one did anything
about it. It was dangerous, you could be hit or killed!
You've been in the Shabelle University Camp for three years. Who
helped you to settle in your current camp?
It was people who came from Dhoobey, and we used to know each
other. When they heard that we got displaced from Maslah camp, a
girl who is married to my cousin came to my rescue. She asked me
where we were moving and I told her that I didn't have anywhere.
We came with some of our belongings – but they destroyed most of
our other things.
So, soldiers were there?
Yes! We came out and sat under the tree with our blankets. Most
other things were just destroyed. She told me to wait outside while
she looks for a car. She took us to her place, and that is how we came
here. So, the girl brought us, we came from where we were living
before to [the camp] here. Thank God for her, we thank God that we
are doing good. We settled here. Even though we fear bloodshed,
fire and fighting on the street, apart from that, it is peaceful here.
All those camps that you were displaced from in the first or second
place belonged to the government. What about this place, who owns
it?
It belongs to some guys from the Abgal clan, but the owner's name is
[first name]. He owns it. One cannot just settle here. The land be-
longs to [him], but some guys rented it from him. If you want to
move in, you ask first the guys who rented it, and they will ask you if
you want live here and build a life here or if you want a temporary
stay. Because, there are those who don't want to live here […] but
just to build tents and move to other camps when there is food-
rationing going on. So, you say you want to live here, and if you say
permanently, then he will give you a place on the land and allow
you to build your tent. If the space isn't enough, like mine – I have
my children with me, my son who is here with his wife, my daughter
who is with her husband and my other daughter […] – they add
more space to build. So, you cannot just move in freely. […]
They don't charge rent, but when assistance comes and if you get
something, they will ask for something small. Those who want to
give to the owners will give, and if you don't want, no one will force
you. […] There are people in Xamar [Mogadishu] who have huts in
this or that camp. There are some places around that are known as
‘buush bariis' [rice huts]. People who live in other neighbourhoods
establish a hut [in a camp] so they can come in the mornings when
food is distributed and get their ration. They are there until the
afternoon, then they just go back home. Then, you don't see them.
They don't spend the night here.9
Wiilo's story epitomises the permanent emergency and ‘state of
exception’ that have characterised large parts of south-central Somalia
since 1991, and the ways ‘bare life’ is generated and maintained. It
indicates the centrality of property as a spatial technology through
which authority materialises in space, and shows how property is so-
cially selective and often violently enacted. Even once property rela-
tions are established, they continue to enact violence on people who are
dispossessed or excluded from access, forcing them to continue a living
at the “edge of catastrophe” and thus rendering their lives precarious,
insecure or bare.10
Wiilo (and many other interviewees) show how displaced people
relied on information from relatives and neighbours who migrated
before them and who either directed them to camps where they
themselves lived or where some assistance was available. Displaced
people without social networks and prior knowledge of the city often
ended-up on the city's streets where they turned to begging for their
survival. However, it usually did not take too long until newcomers
would be directed to one of the camps, to erect make-shift huts (buush)
on land which the interviewees referred to as goof – meaning unin-
habited, unused land. Although uninhabited, these lands were not un-
owned, as interviewees also referred to the Goof-leh, the owners of
unused land, usually a group of people or, as in Wiilo's case, an in-
dividual hailing from a locally dominant lineage group.11
Land owners often rent land to entrepreneurs who initiate camp
settlements. Referred to by displaced people as camp leaders, these
entrepreneurs establish themselves as middlemen between land owners
and the displaced, and, between the displaced and international orga-
nisations. Leaders actively direct displaced people to ‘their’ camps,
trying to gather a large enough number of settlers to be recognised as
camp by international organisations. Several interviewees even re-
ceived initial support to settle from the leaders. See for example
Kheyrta's arrival in Mogadishu:
When I came [to Mogadishu] I didn't come directly to the camp. We
were brought to the main highway. We stayed there for two days
under a big tree. Then a lady came for us and took us to a big field.
Then we built small makeshift houses, and were given a kilo of
sugar, mattresses, food and clothes by the people. The good lady
also distributed 100[$] to each family to build houses. We bought
plastic bags and shaded the house with it (Kheyrta, Mogadishu, 9/
01/2018).
As Wiilo, Kheyrta and others explained, the leaders decide who is
allowed to settle in the camp, register newcomers and identify the spots
where they can set-up huts. Access to the camp can only be gained
through him/her, and resources channeled into camps have to pass the
leader. Leaders often work with a committee of displaced people who
support the daily management of the camp. When asked about the main
activities of leaders, interviewees emphasized their search for interna-
tional support. In case international aid is obtained, the leaders will
take their share.
Many displaced base their decision on which camp to settle in on the
availability of international aid. Particularly those who have settled
longer in Mogadishu actively look for camps with aid connections. Once
a camp regularly receives aid, the inhabitants may have to pay rent:
There are camps in the city that get aid, but the leader needs to
accept you to join. I would have wanted [to move there], but I
cannot [afford]. […] Some of these camps are expensive. You have
to pay monthly to settle and stay there […] like 50,000 SoSh, up to
10$. You also have to pay money before you are given a plot to
settle. You pay to build [huts] there (Aliya, Mogadishu, 09/01/
2018).
International organisations refer to the leaders as ‘gatekeepers’ and
criticize the ‘layers of gatekeeping’ around such camps as they impede
9 Interviews were conducted in Somali, translated and transcribed into
English, then language edited and anonymized.
10 We build here on Duffield's (2019: 115) elaboration of precarity as con-
dition where ‘casualization, informalization or unpredictability of work coexist
with economic vulnerability, environmental uncertainty, and an openness to
surprise and shock.’ Precarity in its extreme form constitutes living conditions
characterised by daily struggles for survival.
11 The Abgal clan she refers to is a Hawiye sub-clan, associated with one of
the self-declared Presidents of 1991, and a clan that inserts considerable in-
fluence in many Mogadishu districts.
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information-management and cause the aid diversion (Saferworld,
2012, p. 16). Interviewees confirmed these challenges, and especially
emphasized the practice of setting up buush bariis (rice huts). Rice huts
are established by Mogadishu residents who, in arrangement with camp
leaders, try to receive their share of international aid. Interviewees
didn't usually criticize this ostensibly deceptive practice. Although they
acknowledged that not only the displaced are in need of support, their
acceptance may also relate to a deeply engrained view of international
aid in Somalia as a public good belonging to everybody who manages to
access it.
Most interviewees were rather positive about the role of gate-
keepers/leaders and referred to their continuous efforts, their respon-
sibilities, and the high costs of daily camp management. Leaders ad-
vocate for hygiene and cleanliness, support people in distress, mediate
disputes, and provide rules for behaviour. They also provide (rudi-
mentary) security as the protection of the leader's clan extends to his/
her property (including businesses) and therefore to the camp. While
leaders' daily engagement is visible to the camp inhabitants, aid orga-
nisations were regularly criticized for their failure to provide support:
In fact, they [the leaders/gatekeepers] help us by building us pit
latrines, they were cooking food for us in the beginning, and because
we were new, they welcomed us very nicely. I've never seen an
organisation in Mogadishu help us (Sokorey, Mogadishu, 08/01/
2018).
Gatekeeping was not viewed as overly problematic, but some in-
terviewees felt that land owners rather than gatekeepers/leaders were
taking advantage of them. Interviewees described how they added
value to the land, made it habitable, cleared bushes and rubble, or dug
pit latrines. Their settlement stimulated economic and social develop-
ment: boreholes and water points were established, electricity brought
to the camp, (private) schools or madrassas started to cater for students,
pharmacies, kiosks and small shops opened. International aid supports
the establishment of schools, mother-child clinics and other services
that attract more displaced people, but also other residents, to settle in
the neighbourhood. However, once a camp is integrated into the city's
commercial, aid, infrastructural and trade networks, the value of the
land rises, and land owners often wish to develop the land or sell it to
private investors, with the consequence that the camp inhabitants are
once again forced to move. Wiilo's experience with evictions are
therefore common in Mogadishu. Shoobta outlined similar dynamics of
propertying, land development and evictions:
[The land] becomes valuable because it was a forest and we made it
liveable land by cutting unwanted trees and cleaning it. And then,
when so many people demand to buy it, they make us move,
claiming that it does not belong to us but that it belongs to them
[…]. After some time, they come with a taxi and they look at the
land all around, and they say this land is wanted, you must move
(Shoobta, Mogadishu, 09/01/2018).
Evictions are part of wider land and property dynamics in post-
conflict environments. Modest improvements in security initiated at-
tempts to reconstruct the city. Investments in building, real-estate, so-
cial and physical infrastructures were driven by the Somali business
class, the diaspora, and international donors. This building boom led to
spiking land and real-estate prices, drawing the attention of govern-
ment and private investors to the large numbers of displaced people
squatting in private or previously state-owned land and (ruined)
buildings. The consequences have been cycles of often violent mass
evictions of people from the increasingly valuable camp estates. In
December 2017, for example, almost 35,000 people were evicted from
the two Mogadishu districts Kahda and Deynille (NRC, 2018). Many
evictees had resided for several years in these settlements, which were
ironically named ‘Protect Rights’ (Xaq Dhowr). These and other evic-
tions destroy the built infrastructure, interrupt social networks and li-
velihoods, and therefore underscore the extreme precarity of camp life.
People living in these camps again lost their few belongings, and were
forced to search for new places and means to rebuild their lives. The
significant increase of such evictions since the Federal Government of
Somalia established its rule in Mogadishu and the increased competi-
tion between actors from the government and those in the ‘regional’
administration governing the city (RVI and HIPS, 2017, pp. 80–88)
exemplify how, in struggles over property, attempts to establish so-
vereignty intersect with attempts to make profit.12
Taken together, investments in the city's built environment, the
gentrification of the centre, and sprawling peri-urbanisation, are con-
tinuously changing the cityscapeand living conditions in Mogadishu.
The articulation of property rights, however, renders the most vulner-
able inhabitants in a continuous state of precarity, enforcing them to
continue moving and precluding their settlement on a secure basis.
4. Property, precarity, and urban planning in Bosaaso
The experiences recounted below by Himilo, a chair-lady and camp
leader in Bosaaso, provide a snapshot of a life that has long been lived
on the move. Her story traces her migration from Ethiopia to
Mogadishu in the wake of the 1977 Somali-Ethiopian war, and then
flight again from conflictand state collapse in the early 1990s. Her at-
tempts to settle and survive in Bosaaso are characteristic of many in-
terviewees who continue to live in situations of long-term displacement
and precarity.
I was born in Ethiopia. My parents migrated with me during 1977
when there was war between Somalia and Ethiopia. We went to
Jalalaqsi [town] as refugees and then came to Mogadishu [ …]. I
grew up in Mogadishu, I married there and had children there too
[…]. At the time of the destruction [of the state] my husband's hand
was injured and we left for Baidoa and Baraawe [southern cities].
Then we entered Ethiopia and eventually reached Addis Ababa. Our
living conditions were hard and crowded and we didn't find a
peaceful place after the destruction, so eventually I came to Bosaaso.
In between, I went to Djibouti, and was in Jigjiga [Ethiopia] […]
Since I came to Bosaaso 18 years ago I have passed through three
places. We were in Tuurjaale, and we moved from there to a place by
the mosque Tawakal. We moved from another place to Raf iyo
Raaho. There was land owned by the people of the community, an
elder I knew had a big plot […] which we were to be transferred to.
We went to the old man to give us a place to live. [We said] you can
see we have been told by the owners of the land that we were
staying on to leave within three days or otherwise the soldiers will
kick us off. It was written on paper that they brought to me […].
This was four years ago. I read it and so I went to the government
and told them that we didn't have money to migrate, and the
number of people in the camp was 800. I went to an old man who
was from the town and who was rich and he gave us land, 400m2,
for free. So, we settled there and I went to the humanitarian agen-
cies called CARE and DRC. They built toilets and they brought two
water tanks for us. We are staying there now, and there is no money
that is being charged for rent […]
We only built makeshift tents [buush] and [once] they [international
organisations] gave us tents with iron poles […]. My house is a tent
and what we built with worn-out cloth is prone to fire. Thieves and
rapists can get in. They are vulnerable to winds and also the heat
during the summer time. So, we are living this type of life (Himilo,
Bosaaso, 30/07/2018).
Himilo has lived for 18 years in Bosaaso, but her everyday continues
to be characterised by precarity. Here too, displaced people have
12 Lund (2016) and Elliott (2016) outlined how colonialists used property to
establish sovereignty while making profit.
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experienced cycles of forced evictions.
The relation between precarity, property and insecurity is increas-
ingly acknowledged by international actors. By 2009, a framework to
provide ‘Durable Solutions’ to displaced populations had been adopted
by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (itself established in 1992 to
coordinate global humanitarian assistance). This framework partly
guided projects to improve housing conditions and provide tenure se-
curity for displaced people in Bosaaso. Implemented between 2005 and
2014 and supported by the Puntland government, Bosaaso's munici-
pality cooperated with international actors, prominent among them UN
Habitat, to resettle 1,700 displaced households to land east of the city.
This rocky and sandy land was privately held, but landowners donated
some of their plots to the municipality. In exchange, their remaining
land was connected to urban services and the value for it increased
(IDMC, 2015, p. 4). The new plots were surveyed, measured and
mapped, and eventually endowed with corrugated metal huts (jiingad)
or stone houses. These were distributed among displaced people
through a lottery in which households that met certain eligibility cri-
teria could participate. Noor, one of the people who received a plot of
land and a corrugated steel house described the process:
I was among the displaced people who was lucky to get a house here
in the camp which was built by the local government for the IDPs. I
got this one room, toilet and kitchen […] it was a lottery and pieces
of paper were put in a box and everybody picked up one piece of
paper […]. I was lucky and we were satisfied. God gave it to us. We
were [previously] in tents that were vulnerable to thieves, and there
was rape. I fled my house one night after an attempted rape. Because
of this, I took my children elsewhere. I also fell then and injured my
arm that night. There is a scar (Noor, Bosaaso 23/12/2017).
The lottery system reflects the arbitrariness of property regimes,
which always only benefit certain ‘lucky’ families. The less lucky, those
unable to benefit from the distribution of houses, remained vulnerable
to evictions from private owners who rent or sell their property as the
city grows and property prices increase. The distribution of houses was
connected to an incremental tenure model, aimed at a processual in-
crease of housing security. Recipients receive full property rights only
after they have lived in their houses for consecutive fifteen years
(IDMC, 2015).13 In this way, a new set of neighbourhoods for pre-
viously displaced people has emerged on the far south-eastern outskirts
of the city.
The proximity of the settlement to the city attests to attempts to
support the displaced settlers in retaining their social and economic
networks (IDMC, 2015). Being placed east of a newly built bypass road
also facilitated transport and enabled easy access to the city. The by-
pass, however, also demarcated the separation of the settlements from
the city and transformed them into a kind of satellite neighbourhood.
The image of a separate town, populated by people with different clan
affiliations to those of the majority of Bosaaso's inhabitants, was en-
hanced by the infrastructural developments that followed, among them
the establishment, shops, health centres, a police station, and mosque.
Khalid, another ‘winner’ of the lottery described:
Now you have visited us in the day time, but if you visited us at
night, you would say this camp is the town, the big town of Bosaaso.
Now you are in the centre of the IDP camps and all sides are other
IDP camps. At night, the lights are on and the businesses are open
till the morning (Khalid, Bosaaso, 25/12/2017).
The geometrical arrangement of the settlement with its straight-
lined roads and adjacent rectangle houses, render the settlements near
ideal-typical examples of a Foucauldian disciplinary space (Foucault,
1978, p. 11 , pp. 34-35.). Hospitals, asylums or prisons are regularly
used as examples of how space is disciplined to enhance surveillance
and control. However, 19th century European working-class housing
estates provide a more suitable comparison. Such working-class estates
were designed to tackle the ‘urban problem’ associated with in-
dustrialisation and the emergent labour class (Driver, 1988, p. 277),
while camp settlements in Bosaaso show a modern attempt to tackle
‘urban problems’ associated with conflict, droughts and displacement.
However, urban planning here is part of global forms of governance in
which, as Agamben outlined, international actors cooperate with
(weak) sovereigns. While this cooperation provided shelter and en-
hanced the tenure and physical security of some of the displaced, it
simultaneously excludes others from the same prerogatives and con-
tribute to their spatial segregation. Property, as outlined above, is an
organised social enclosure and it is linked to the formation of authority
and sovereignty. In Bosaaso (as in other conflict prone environments),
international organisations take over important government roles, in-
cluding the generation of knowledge (maps, surveys etc.) that accom-
pany the definition, demarcation and distribution of property. Aid ac-
tors thereby transmit disciplinary characteristics to the settlements as
they contribute to the partitioning (and segregation) of urban space,
and to the placing of bodies in spatial arrangements that permit clas-
sification and enhance control, especially when compared with the
messy spatial arrangements that characterise camps in Mogadishu. The
ease with which these arrangements can be securitized was demon-
strated when people hailing from southern Somalia were suspected of
harbouring Al-Shabaab operatives. Reacting to attacks in the city,
Puntland officials defined the re-settlement areas as ‘danger zones’
(Haji, 2012, p. 44) and in 2010 authorised round-ups and deportations
of people to southern Somalia. Deportations to what were seen as their
rightful ‘home’ regions, show that even people who receive re-settle-
ment provision are not necessarily perceived as belonging to the city.
The subsequent amassing of ‘‘outsiders’ in a spatially segregated cluster
may allow for their further othering and association with militants.
The disciplining of space and bodies described above does not
follow some grand, evil plan of ‘western’ or other aid actors aiming to at
take control of southern, post-colonial (or otherwise defined) states and
people. Instead, international actors cooperate with sovereigns - the
Puntland state and municipality authorities - and together execute
power in a way that ostensibly promotes the interests of the ruled. After
all, the programmes are improving tenure security, housing conditions,
health and wellbeing for the re-settled, and interviews with the lucky
ones attest to the positive effects of this form of government. Power, in
Foucault's reading, is not a top-down activity, but needs to be deci-
phered within networks of continuously developing and changing social
relations. Above all, power does not merely subdue and suppress, but
also enables, generates and improves (Foucault, 1994, p. 38).
Conversely, although space is disciplined in Somalia, it is not
monitored consistently, and multiple forms of authority continue to co-
exist. The utilisation of space therefore deviated swiftly from its ori-
ginally planned schematic. The Bosaaso settlements have become a
preferred destination for new (unregistered) arrivals, among them often
relatives of those who had already received a plot and who often erect
own dwellings close to their family members. Others who were less
lucky did not simply wait until they moved upwards on the waiting lists
of the municipality, but started to acquire plots in the wider settlement
area. The prior practice in which displaced people enter into agree-
ments with landowners to erect temporary shelters on un-used land, has
continued in close vicinity to the new settlements. Ruptures to linear,
rectangular architectural designs attest to the dynamic (re)use of the
resettlement areas and the land that surrounds them. The permanent
stone and semi-permanent corrugated steel huts built through the re-
settlement scheme, along with the make-shift tents that now inter-
mingle with them, signify the ambiguities of property, ownership and
land rights and alternative forms of propertying that subvert original
plans.
13 Interviewees often seemed unaware of the incremental tenure or under-
stood the 15-years period as simply a longer-term settlement agreement with
the land owners.
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Additionally, some of the lucky new owners started to rent their
houses or even sell their titles, often to people who were anticipating a
rise in the land's value. Beyond such speculations, the high rate of di-
vorce and family breakup further contributed to such sales and de-
monstrates the gendered nature of propertying. A Somali NGO-worker
explained that women who were provided with tenure or ownership
documents, often hand them over to their husbands who, after divorce,
sell them to a local buyer. While these men may move to other places,
their ex-wives often return to the settlement. However, as the woman is
already registered as a beneficiary of the housing scheme, she can't get
another plot (NGO-worker, Bosaaso, 02/10/2018).
The arrangements in Bosaaso have also given rise to new forms of
intermediation and gatekeeping. Chairpersons and organising com-
mittees emerged in the new settlements, and they too serve as point of
access mediating between settlers, the municipality, private landowners
(who still threaten some residents in the vicinity with eviction) and
humanitarian organisations. Unlike in Mogadishu, the camps' chair-
persons were registered and thus acknowledged as settlement re-
presentatives by the municipal government. The chairpersons’ role in
the local government has become similar to the leaders of other town
neighbourhoods, albeit with important differences remaining:
The chairman of an IDP camp and the sixteen chairmen of the
Bosaaso neighbourhoods do not get equal rights. The neighbour-
hood chairman has a salary, he can participate in elections, the
education fee of his family is covered by the government, he is part
of the government, he has a budget, he is a known person and he is a
member of the host community so, what he suggests will come into
action, but my suggestion will not work. These are my specific
challenges and I have the same responsibilities, or even more re-
sponsibilities than him (Chairman, Bosaaso 25/12/2017).
The entrepreneurial strategies of gate-keeping that characterise
Mogadishu camps are less evident in Bosaaso's new settlements, where
short-term emergency assistance is decreasing. However, as resettle-
ment areas continue to evolve, and many displaced people continue to
settle on privately-owned land (where tenure insecurity persists), gate-
keeping continues, as does the practice of establishing rice huts (NGO
worker, Bosaaso 02/01/2018). The close cooperation with state actors
has nonetheless affected opportunities for gate-keeping and is likely to
contribute to the development of state-centred forms of intermediation
that characterise other aid dependent states (Bayart, 2000).
The cooperative planning of satellite cities for displaced people
amount to a particular form of ‘inclusive exclusion’ (Agamben, 1998, p.
9; Minca, 2015, p. 82). The exclusionary logics of property persist in the
ambiguities of land ownership at the city's periphery. The planned re-
settlement scheme has created a new centre of gravity which draws in
new arrivals, and within which mechanisms for ‘incremental tenure’ are
translated, adapted and transferred through circuits of local power
between humanitarian agencies, the municipal government, private
landowners and ‘community’ representatives. Ultimately, however,
economic precarity hinders the ability of the displaced to fully capita-
lise on opportunities brought by external settlement initiatives. Eco-
nomic disparities are prevalent and livelihoods of displaced remain
extremely insecure. This was repeatedly cited as main factor preventing
displaced people from formalising ownership of land. The logic of re-
settlement has itself set the trajectory for the articulation of local
property rights, with displaced people now being forced to stake and
negotiate their claims in a designated area outside of the city proper.
The extent to which this will constitute a ‘durable solution’ may be
contingent on the economic viability of these settlements in relation to
Bosaaso town, the interaction of layers of authority, and differential
access to the benefits of international aid regimes.
5. Conclusion
This article has compared war-induced urbanisation in Mogadishu
and Bosaaso. Both cities have over the years experienced large scale in-
migration of displaced people, many of them moving to camps where
they hope to improve their security, find employment and receive some
kind of aid. Comparative analysis of the erection, maintenance and
government of camps contrasted the seemingly spontaneously estab-
lished settlements in Mogadishu with the planned ‘durable solution’
settlements in Bosaaso. Building on Agamben's spatial theory of so-
vereignty and displacement, the paper identified property as analytical
category used to empirically differentiate forms of sovereignty and to
further nuance the layered ‘sites of exception’ that emerge in the midst
of a generalised state of exception. Sovereignty remains connected to
the right to claim lives, but this right is executed, among others,
through (often quite violent) competitions over property, which are in
turn connected to and reconfigure forms of belonging.
The article has explored the ways in which property is practiced. It
has looked into actors, relations and activities performed to designate
land for urban settlements, to make this land habitable, and to manage
the relations between the inhabitants and the outside world. The
struggles to define and categorize rights of ownership, and the attempts
to couple them with questions of belonging in both cities became part of
ongoing contests for sovereignty. These contests are particularly dy-
namic in Mogadishu and carried out at the expense of displaced people,
many of whom experience cycles of forced evictions. Although reduced
to bare life and made disposable, displaced people have not simply been
passive victims. They have remained on the look-out for options to act
and retain agency, however limited. Displaced people in both cities
actively navigate existing property regimes, try to get access to property
and to improve their positions vis-à-vis dominant agents in these con-
texts.
The emphasis on social practices of propertying not only helps to
unravel the makings of sovereignty, but simultaneously exemplifies
how sovereignty is embedded in the (global) political economy. In
propertying, struggles for sovereignty intersect with struggles for profit.
The gentrification of camp neighbourhoods in Mogadishu attest to this,
as does the resettlement of displaced people to less valuable land at
Bosaaso's outskirts. Whilst the durable solutions initiative increased the
locational security of resettled people it continued to demonstrate the
arbitrary and exclusionary character of property. The resettlement
improved the tenure security of some lucky few among those who had
managed to survive years of violent ‘disposal’, and who will in the next
fifteen years be able to call themselves owners of a small piece of urban
land and, by then, a likely-deteriorated steel hut. Property in the new
settlements of Bosaaso has become the material expression of the “in-
terrogation of the worth and eligibility of the living across a terrain of
value” (Dillon, 2005, p. 41). This interrogation is shaped by globally
circulating knowledge which makes truth claims about values of life,
for example by defining, identifying and registering those who qualify
as displaced, and those who do not, or by organising lotteries that select
winners of land.
Both city examples also show that urban camps in Somalia are
places that are acted upon and that are jointly, but not necessarily
cooperatively, governed by local, national, regional and international
institutions. These negotiate with each other and, to a limited extent,
with the displaced. Although the formation of political authority in and
after violent conflict is always locally specific, the examples also de-
monstrate that formations of authority are embedded in global struc-
tures – whether the global regime of (militarized) humanitarianism or
the equally global property market. However, global structures always
materialize in particular places where spaces, bodies, objects, subjects,
knowledge and violence are assembled into concrete material and so-
cial figurations. In empirically examining the emergence and evolution
of formations of political authority in the midst of a normalized crisis,
and by emphasizing the experiences of the displaced themselves, this
analysis has shown that agency is exercised even by people who em-
body ‘bare lives’. Urban camps in Somalia are globally governed for-
mations of precarity. They may be located at the ‘edge of the world’
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(Mbembé and Rendall, 2000), but they nonetheless remain a part of it
and are shaped by its socio-political logics and the multiple agencies
that contribute to their emergence.
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